Abstract
Introduction
The computerisation of personal data has increased the efficiency and productivity of organisations. Brumen et al (2002) believe that the amount of data that is stored by organisations doubles approximately every 15 months. A large proportion of personal data is regarded as being sensitive and confidential and the use and storage of such a data type has a certain degree of risk associated with it.
Once a database is outside of an organisation's secure environment, it may be used for purposes other than those for which it was originally intended. Data may be inaccurate or incomplete. Inadequate safety measures may lead to the disclosure of sensitive data. An organisation may be able to access a large range of personal data by linking several databases together. This data may enable an organisation to profile individuals, which could influence any decisions that an organisation may have to make regarding an individual (O'Leary, 1995) . The risks associated with using and storing personal data have fuelled the development of international data privacy guidelines.
The aim of this paper is to promote an awareness of international, personal data protection legislation with a view to determining some of the criteria necessary for the safeguarding of personal data within an organisation. This paper would be of interest to individuals who wish to grasp an overview of their rights to privacy, and also to personal data collectors and processors. This paper creates a strategy that will assist organisations wishing to create and manage a secure environment for the storing and processing of personal data. Once personal data has been transferred to a third party its privacy is reliant upon the privacy legislation that that particular third party must adhere to.
Section 2 defines privacy terms that are used throughout this paper. Section 3 describes four different types of privacy models. These models form the framework on which most international guidelines are structured.
Section 4 addresses a number of countries and the privacy guidelines enforced by these countries. In order for an organisation to develop a secure environment it is necessary to be aware of the larger picture, that is, management must be aware of policies that are implemented at an international level. This awareness is also required if an organisation intends to transfer personal data to a third body. As will be discussed in Section 4, in most countries it is the responsibility of the organisation that is transferring data to a third party to ensure that the third party and any other parties that may obtain the information adhere to certain data protection legislation.
This section also identifies some concerns that arise out this international investigation.
Many organisations, such as hospitals, do not posses in-house expertise for data analysis. Because of this and other factors, such as cost benefits, organisations often have to disclose personal data to a third party for the purpose of outsourcing. Organisations that publish statistical data or dis close data for the purposes of analysis can apply a number of data protection techniques to data. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of these techniques; instead only two techniques are described. These techniques are cell suppression and encryption. These techniques are described in Section 5 and were chosen because they are commonly implemented by statistical and medical agencies. Models adopted from Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) are presented in Section 6. The purpose of these models is to provide managers with a strategic framework for the development of a secure data environment.
Definitions
Before discussing the various privacy laws, it is necessary to define a number of terms that will be used throughout the paper. These definitions are based on those defined by the Irish Data Protection Act 1998. "data means information in a form in which it can be processed" (The Data Protection Commissioner, 2004) ; "data controller means a person who, either alone or with others, controls the contents and use of personal data" (The Data Protection Commissioner, 2004) ; "data processor means a person who processes personal data on behalf of a data controller but does not include an employee of a data controller who processes such data in the course of his employment" (The Data Protection Commissioner, 2004) ; "data subject means an individual who is the subject of personal data" (The Data Protection Commissioner, 2004) ; "disclosure, in relation to personal data, includes t he disclosure of information extracted from such data and the transfer of such data but does not include a disclosure made directly or indirectly by a data controller or a data processor to an employee or agent of his for the purpose of enabling the employee or agent to carry out his duties; and, where the identification of a data subject depends partly on the data and partly on other information in the possession of the data controller, the data shall not be regarded as disclosed unless the other information is also disclosed" (The Data Protection Commissioner, 2004) ; "personal data means data relating to a living individual who can be identified either from the data or from the data in conjunction with other information in the possession of the data 
Models of Data Privacy
The Privacy and Human Rights 2002 International Survey identifies four models of data privacy: Comprehensive Laws, Sectoral Laws, Self-Regulation and Technologies of Privacy.
• Comprehensive Laws
Comprehensive Laws are general laws that are imposed on both the private and public sectors. These laws are enforced by appointed governing bodies.
The EU Directive is modelled on this type of model.
• Sectoral Laws
Unlike comprehensive laws, sectoral laws are specific government laws relating to a specific area, such as the financial or educational sector.
Each time a new technology is developed a sectoral law relating to this new technology must be introduced. The author believes that this rigid framework is less secure than the comprehensive approach. The concept of having to specify specific laws leaves too much room for possibility of the accidental disclosure of personal data. The United States have adopted this approach under the Safe Harbor agreement. Sectoral laws should ideally be enforced in conjunction with comprehensive laws, where the sectoral laws provide a more detailed level of security for certain high-risk areas (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002 ).
• Self-Regulation Self-Regulation is generally used in conjunction with sectoral laws. No national governing body is appointed, instead an industry body or even a single organisation is left with the task of enforcing data privacy legislation within that body or organisation. Organisations are also permitted to draw up their own "codes of practice". This idea of self-regulation is employed under the Safe Harbor agreement, however it has not proven to be very successful, as many of the codes of practice are weak and fail to provide adequate security (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002) . Another drawback is the fact that without an outside body monitoring the organisation's activities, many organisations fail to enforce these codes. This failure in the self-policing aspect is possibly due the fact that there is little fear of them being penalised if they fail to do so (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002) .
•
Technologies of Privacy
Individuals who are concerned about protecting personal data may turn to forms of technology such as encryption, electronic signatures or even digital cash. This approach is termed as the "Technologies of Privacy" model.
International Privacy Legislation
Different cultures have different views of what should fall under the classification of "personal data" (St. Amant, 1999) . In response to this diversity, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) came into force on 30 th September 1961 (The Interdependence of Nations and the Peace of Canada, 1973) .
It contains guidelines that are designed to promote certain policies, some of which attempt to achieve the following:
• A high standard of living in EU member countries.
• High sustainable economic and employment within these member countries.
• Maintain financial stability and by doing so, contribute to the development of the world economy.
• Contribute to economic expansion in member and non-member countries • Expand world trade and do so in a nondiscriminatory way
There are eight principles defined by the OECD, addressing issues including; collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual participation and accountability. An in-depth study of these principles can be found in the report entitled "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance"(1999).
The guidelines, presented by the OECD, govern the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (OECD, 1981) . There are 30 members in the OECD. Most of these have adopted the guidelines provided by the OECD as statuary law, in whole or in part (O'Leary,1995) .
In an attempt to standardise data protection laws and to restrict access to personal data regarding European Union (EU) citizens, the (EU), in October of 1998, adopted a series of privacy laws (St. Amant, 1999) . These laws are collectively known as the EU Directive. The EU Directive prevents EU member countries from sending their data to nations that do not have appropriate privacy policies.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (AEPC) was developed in 1989 (APEC Home Page, 2004) . Its main aims are to facilitate economic growth, trade and co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. APEC has 21 members, which account for more than a third of the world's population. APEC attempts to provide a safe environment for the crossborder transferral of people and goods (APEC Home Page, 2004) . The APEC enforces principles that have been adapted from the OECD Guidelines. These principles are the first step towards developing an Asia-Pacific standard for data privacy (Baker & McKenzie, 2003) . It is argued that these principles are a "watered-down version" for the OECD and do not provide adequate privacy measures (Baker & McKenzie, 2003) . Table 4 .1 summaries a number of countries and their data privacy status. This section discusses data privacy legislation in Ireland, India, Hong Kong, Australia and The United States. These countries were chosen as case studies as it was felt they represented Europe, America and Asia, and so provided an insight into the diversity of data privacy legislation.
Ireland
The Irish government has introduced a number of laws relating to data privacy. In 1988 the Data Privacy Act was introduced. The introduction of this act was a means of implementing the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. Although this act regulated personal data that was being collected and processed in both the public and private sectors, it only applied to data that was automatically processed.
In response to pressure being applied from the European Commission, including being brought before the European Court of Justice in January 2000 for enforcing inadequate privacy legislation, Ireland amended this act in 2003 (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002 At the time of collecting data, the individuals who are providing the information must be made aware of the purpose behind the gathering of the data. The identity of the collecting body and of those, to whom the information may be disclosed, must be revealed. Organisations, who wish to provide personal information to other data collectors, must make this intention know to the data providers. The individuals have the right not to deny the collecting body the right to use personal information for secondary/ future usage. In the event of an organisation requiring the usage of personal data for a reason other than that which was specified at the time of collection, the organisation must reveal this new intent to the data providers and request their consent.
Principle
2 -Keep the data only for specified and lawful purposes "the data shall be kept only for one or more specified and lawful purposes" -section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Act Any personal data that is being held on a computer must be held for a specific, lawful purpose. It is unlawful to house any data that is irrelevant to the purpose for which it was specified. A data contributor has the right to know the purpose for which their information is being processed.
Principle 3 -Use and Disclosure Data should only be disclosed and used in ways that are compatible with the purposes for which it was originally given.
"the data shall not be used or disclosed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes" -section 2(1)(c)(ii) of the Act The data controller specifies the purpose of gathering the personal data when they register with the Data Protection Commissioner. Data cannot be processed for any reason other than those for which they have registered. It is worth noting that it may be necessary for organisations to release their personal data to external agents. If the agents are carrying out work on behalf of the organisation and are not keeping the personal data for their own purposes, then disclosure has not occurred. An example of such an event would be a doctor providing a laboratory with a patient's data for the purpose of an analysis of the patient's blood.
Principle 4 -Data must be kept safe and secure "appropriate security measures shall be taken against unauthorised access to, or alteration, disclosure or destruction of, the data and against their accidental loss or destruction" -section 2(1)(d) of the Act It is the responsibility of the data provider to ensure that all personal data is stored in a secure environment. The extent of the security measures that a data controller must implement, with respect to the storage of personal data, depends on the sensitivity of the data.
Principle 5 -Accurate and up-to-date data "the data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up-to-date" -section 2(1)(b) of the Act It is the responsibility of the data controller to ensure that personal data is accurate and kept up-to-date. The inaccurate recording of data may lead to an organisation being liable to a data provider for damages.
Principle 6 -Adequate, relevant and not excessive "the data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to that purpose or purposes" -section 2(1)(c)(iii) of the Act No more personal data than is deemed necessary to serve the purpose for which the data is intended should be obtained. The amount of data gathered should not be excessive.
This attempts to prevent an organisation from achieving a purpose other than that for which it is registered. The data that is collected should be relevant and adequate. -In response to Sept 11 th , the Slovene Information Security Agency (SOVA) has been reported to be monitoring e-mails and telephone calls. -Numerous public revelations of illegal wiretapping.
-EU and OECD has put pressure on Switzerland to weaken the 1934 Banking Act à this would allow easier access to records for the purpose of tax collection. 
Thailand v v Data Protection in the Public

Principle 8 -The Data Contributors Rights
An individual has the right to request a copy of any personal information that an organisation is storing about them. The organisation must ensure that the individual is provided with this information within a period of 40 days. Once a request has been received by an organisation, the organisation cannot modify any of the existing data regarding to the individual. The holding body must not alter or delete any information in an attempt to hide information from the individual. The data disclosed to the individual must not be Individuals wishing to obtain a record of their personal data must apply, in writing, to the collecting body. They must als o provide the collecting body with any information that may help the body to identify the individual's data. Identification may, for example, be provided in the form of a customer account number or a social security number. It is left to the discretion of each organisation as to whether an individual has to pay for the retrieval of their information. However, this retrieval fee cannot exceed €6.35. The individual is also fully entitled to submit complains regarding their information.
Information that i s inaccurate must be rectified or erased on their behalf. Organisations must also accommodate an individual's right to be removed from a marketing or mailing list should they desire so (The Data Protection Commissioner, 2004).
India
A large percentage of companies outsource to India and the primary factor behind this is the cost saving benefits that it offers (Harvey, 2003) . As a result of low labour costs, outsourcing to India can be up to 80 percent cheaper than keeping work in-house (Harvey, 2003) . A advantage that favours India over other low labour cost countries is the fact that the English language is facilitated in a majority of organisations, thus permitting international English speaking organisations to easily communicate with Indian organisations (Harvey, 2003) .
However, outsourcing companies run the risk of violating EU rules if they outsource to an organisation that does not enforce adequate privacy legislation. This is one of the main driving forces behind countries, outside the EU, to adopt privacy legislation.
Without such legislation, countries in the E.U. would not be permitted to transfer data to countries such as India or the United States, thus severely damaging the Indian or American economy.
There is no data protection law in India (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002 Indian legislation gives broad discretion to law enforcement authorities. Under Section 69, law authorities are permitted access to all computerised data. The authorities are entitled to condemn individuals, who refuse to hand over personal data or provide encryption keys, to a sevenyear jail sentence. Although legal authorities throughout the world are afforded similar rights, Section 69 seems to concern many countries.
Government corruption within India has lead many countries to believe that the Indian Data Protection Policies have been manipulated by government officials (Human Rights Watch, 2001) . Policies are being used as a means of enforcing propaganda and censorship. Organisations have objected to the extent of the access and interception rights that the government is entitled to (United States India Business Council, 2002).
Hong Kong
The right to privacy in China is a cultural is sue that has been fuelled by its socialist culture. In Chinese culture it is difficult for individuals to identify the difference between a "shameful secret" (yinsi) and "privacy" (vinsi) (Zhu, 1997).
However, as China becomes more business orientated, its socialist lifestyle is changing and the issue of privacy is increasing in importance.
At present, there is no general data protection law in China (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002) . In an attempt to resolve this, The Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance w as brought into force on 20 th December 1996 (Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 2004). It was influenced by the OECF Guidelines and the EC Directive. The primary objective of the Ordinance was to protect the privacy rights of living individuals. With respect to Hong Kong, the Ordinance permits Hong Kong to transfer personal data freely to countries that also have data protection policies, thus safeguarding Hong Kong's economic well being. The Ordinance has six data protection principles.
Principl e 1 -Purpose and manner of collection
Under this principle an organisation is required to state the purpose for which it is gathering personal data. The organisation is only permitted to store data that is relevant to this purpose. An organisation has the right to make an individual aware of the consequences should they decide not to co-operate with the data collector. The data collector should make the individual aware of any other agents who may be given access to their personal information.
The individual should be informed of their right to access any information that the organisation may store about them (The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, 2004).
Principle 2 -Accuracy and Duration of retention of personal data. Data should be kept accurate and destroyed once it has served its purpose.
If an organisation has reason to believe that the data may be inaccurate it should either try to find a more accurate source of information or dispose of the data. Incomplete data falls under the c ategory of inaccurate data (The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, 2004).
Principle 3 -Use of Personal Data
This principle expands on the conditions specified under Principle 1. It allows an organisation to use data for a purpose other than that for which was specified at the time of collection. An organisation wishing to do so, must make this new purpose known to the individual and re-seek their permission for the use of their data (The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, 2004).
Principle 4 -Security of Personal Data
An organisation is responsible for ensuring that the personal data and data it possesses is stored in a secure environment, and if it is being transmitted, then the transmission medium is secure. This principle also obliges an organisation to ensure that the processing of personal data does not cause harm to the individual. This includes erasing certain items of data. Practical measures of protecting data must be enforced. The extent to which an organisation implements measures of security is left to their own discretion and interpretation of what are suitable measures of security for the data that they possess (The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, 2004).
Principle 5 -information to be generally available "All practical steps shall be taken to ensure that a person can-(a) ascertain a data user's policies and practices in relation to personal data; (b) be informed of the kind of personal data held by a data user; (c) be informed of the main purposes for which personal data held by a data user are or are to be used." (The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, 2004) An organisation is obliged to tell an individual what data they are storing about them and the purpose of storing this data. This information needs only be disclosed by an organisation should they be requested to do so by the individual (The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, 2004).
Principle 6 -access to personal data Individuals can expect to view any data that organis ation is storing about them. The data, which they are shown, must be presented in a manner that is easy for them to understand; i.e. all codes and abbreviations should be explained. An organisation, under certain circumstances, has a right to refuse to disclose information. On the occurrence of such an event, an organisation must provide an individual with a valid reason for withholding information.
Should the individual be dissatisfied with the reason, they are entitled to object to the refusal (The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, 2004 
Australia
The Australia Constitution does not explicitly recognise the right to privacy (Caslon Analytics, 2004) . However, Australia has been a member of the OECD since 1971. Australia introduced The Commonwealth Privacy Act in 1988. Its introduction gave effect to Australia's commitment under the OEDC Guidelines. It comprises of eleven Information Privacy Principles (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002) . These principles are based on the OECD Guidelines and cover the same issues as Hong Kong's principles (Rooney, 2002) . Under the Privacy Act, data users are required to develop and enforce their own data p rivacy codes.
The Australia Privacy Commissioner must approve these codes. As with European Legislation, under the privacy act, organisations involved in transborder operations, may only transfer data to countries that enforce legislation similar to Australia's (Rooney, 2002) .
If adequate privacy legislation is not enforced, then the transferring organisation must receive the approval of the data subject before transferral take place (Rooney, 2002) . In a survey conducted by Rooney, (2002) 13 major commercially significant jurisdictions in Asia were surveyed as to whether they had specific privacy legislation in place. The results of the survey revealed that specific legislation only existed in Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan.
The United States -Safe Harbor
The Safe Harbor agreement came into effect in October 1998 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004). The U.S. Department of Commerce developed the safe harbor framework in consultation with the European Commission. The purpose of the framework was to produce guidelines for the management of personal data within U.S. organisations. It was hoped that by following these guidelines, U.S. organisations would be in compliance with the EU Directive and would therefore be able to interact and share data amongst international organisations, thus promoting and developing international commerce. Principle 1 -Notice Individuals must be made aware of the purpose for which personal data about the individual is being collected and of any third parties that may be permitted access to their data. If an organisation offers choices that enable an individual to limit the use of their data, then it is the responsibility of the organisation to inform the individual of such choices. They must be provided with contact information, so that if they wish to make further requirements or complain about the use of their data they can do so (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004).
Data protection in the United
Principle 2 -Choice
If an organisation wishes to allow a third party to access sensitive data, then it must receive the permission of the individual before doing so. If the information is not deemed sensitive and if permission to allow third parties access to personal data was granted by the individual at the time the data was collected, then the organisation is not obliged to re-seek the individuals permission before allowing a third party access to it (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004).
Principle 3 -Onward Transfer
An organisation is only permitted to transfer data to a third party that conforms to the requirements of the safe harbour principles, the EU Directive or alternative adequate body. If the third party fails to meet such requirements, then the organisation may enter into an agreement with the third party. The agreement would typically be in the form of a written statement in which the third party guarantees that it will provide a level of protection that is required by the safe harbor principles (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004).
Principle 4 -Access
Individuals have the right to request that an organisation provide them with any personal information that they possess relating to that individual. Should the organisation hold inaccurate data or data that the individual is dissatisfied with, then the organisation must either correct or erase this information. However, an organisation has the right to deny an individual access to data if they believe that the access costs do not justify the request, i.e. if the risks attached to the inaccuracy of the data being requested are not considered high (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004).
Principle 5 -Security
Organisations are responsible for ensuring that personal data is stored and processed in a reasonably secure environment. The level of security is left to the discretion of the organisation (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004).
Principle 6 -Data Integrity
An organisation should take reasonable steps to ensure that the accuracy and completeness of the data that it is processing is adequate and relevant for its intended purpose (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2004).
Principle 7 -Enforcement
Organisations must have a system in place that deals with and resolves individual's complaints. 
International Review
An initial objective of this paper was to investigate data privacy legislation throughout the world with the aim of proposing data protection principles that could be adopted in all countries world-wide. However, after an extensive study of a vast number of countries, the author has come to the conclusion that the introduction of an international data privacy act is not a possibility in the foreseeable future. There are too many prohibiting factors including government corruption, cultural beliefs and lack of financial backing to allow this to happen. The map displayed in Figure  4 .1 provides a general overview of the status of privacy legislation on an international basis. As is evident from the map, most of Africa, Southern Asia and America are devoid of comp rehensive data protection laws, although it must be remembered that America does have the Safe Harbor agreement. Any of these locations that have no data legislation, or with legislation pending are potential threats to the disclosure of data. They are often referred to as "data havens" (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002) .
With the advances in modern technology, data can easily find its way to these havens. It is with this concern in mind that the European Commission has placed restrictions on the crossborder transfer of data (Council of Europe, 1981) .
The rapidly evolving nature of technology has meant that a number of data protection laws have become dated. These laws do not address the issue of data protection with respect to these new technologies. The exemptions bestowed upon certain law enforcement and intelligence agencies are also a major cause for concern. As discussed earlier, China is one such country where corrupt government officials have exploited such exemptions. Another factor that is currently influencing privacy legislation is the war against terrorism. The events of September 11 th 2001 have led to governments calling for a re-examination of data protection laws. In particular, proposals to increase the access rights of intelligence agencies to personal data have been drafted (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002) . These proposals are responsible for the introduction of new privacy laws on a weekly basis (Privacy and Human Rights, 2002) . (Banisar, 2003) The author strongly advises that an organisation that is responsible for the collecting, transferring or processing of data should take its own measures to ensure that data privacy is adequately protected. International legislation has proven inadequate or to contain too many loopholes with regard to data privacy legislation, and it is therefore irresponsible for an organisation not to have a privacy strategy that takes these factors into consideration.
Preparing personal data for analysis
It may, at times, be necessary for the collectors of personal data to publish or disclose information based on this data. Such collectors include government bodies who may need to publish statistical information or medical staff who must disclose patient data to a third party for the purpose of research. These collectors must ensure that they do not compromise the privacy of the businesses or the people to whom the data refers.
Data sensitivity is directly proportional to privacy measures. The more sensitive/confidential the data, the greater the necessity to protect it.
The criteria for defining data sensitivity are dependent on the type of data being processed and the policies of the system. If data is deemed very sensitive, then it may be necessary to withhold certain data. If this data were released it could lead to the identification of the individual involved, examples of this are described in the following sections. There is generally a tradeoff between disclosure risk and information loss. The following section identifies two techniques, cell suppression and an encryption-based technique, that are employed by data collectors to ensure that sensitive data is not accidentally disclosed. The author chose to discuss these techniques because they are commonly implemented within statistical agencies and are rather simplistic.
Cell suppression
Data is generally released in "sets", where a set refers to a set of records. The number of records in a set is often used as a means of determining the sensitivity of count data. The calculation of the set sensitivity involves the declaration of a threshold n. The value of this threshold is chosen so that the probability of identifying an individual record from the record set is acceptably small. If the number of records in the queried set is less than the threshold then the data is deemed sensitive and is withheld (Cox, 1980) . This thresholding method is inadequate for determining the sensitivity of magnitude data (e.g. economic data). Malvestuto and Moscarini (1996) observe that if the contribution of a single record to the total of a particular statistic is dominating, then it is possible that this record may be identified. Even if a single record is not dominating, it may still be possible to identify individual contributors. The identification of records may, in this case, be made by the contributors of the information. Contributors may use knowledge of their own data to estimate the identity of some of the other contributors. A possible solution to this sensitivity issue is the implementation of the (n,k)-dominance rule. This rule is based on the percentage each record contributions to the set. According to this rule, a set of records is sensitive if n or fewer records within the set constitute more than k percent of the total of a particular statistic.
Censored tables are tables from which certain values/cells are missing (suppressed). These values are purposely withheld from the tables in an attempt to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information.
Cells containing sensitive information are known as sensitive cells. Although there are a variety of methods available to facilitate the protection of data within tables, these include noise addition, rounding and global recoding, the cell suppression method offers the most protection with the fewest theoretical problems (Willenborg et al, 1996) . When representing data in a two-dimensional table, it is common practice to include, in addition to regular cells, marginal cells (Hsu and Kao, 1997 The information that is obtained regarding the suppressed cell is leaked information. Brumen et al (2002) propose a data protection approach which is specifically designed to allow an analysis of statistical medical data, whilst protecting the confidentiality of the data. The approach encrypts tables and their contents.
Statistical data
Encryption is performed by assigning a unique identification number to each value in the table. The encrypted tables are presented for statistical analysis. This approach was developed because existing techniques were deemed inappropriate for the protection of medical data. It was found that the existing systems e ither generalised any data that was identified as being sensitive or did not disclose this data at all. Medical professionals need to analysis all of the data, that is, no data should be omitted. Therefore, systems, which protect data by withholding sensitive data, do not fulfil the requirements of the medical profession.
In an attempt to explain their method, Brumen et al (2002) present two tables, T 1 and T 2 as illustrated in Figure 5 .3. The table T 1 = Patients contains data describing patients. The table T 2 = Illnesses describes the illnesses that each patient was diagnosed with, and the date that this diagnosis was made. The technique is described in the following four steps. (Brumen et al, 2002) . A table stating the mapping between  table names is created ( Figure 5.4(a) ). From the syntax for this step (equ (8) The "NewName" attribute represents the new name that is assigned to a table, after it has been transformed.
P_ID
STEP 1:
STEP 2:
A table with mappings between attribute names is created ( Figure 5.4(b) ). The structure for this table is similar to that of step 1. The table stores each attribute, the table that the attribute is stored in, the name of the attribute and the new name that is assigned to the attribution in the transformed table. The syntax for this table is shown in equ (9).
STEP 3:
This stage involves populating the two tables that were created in steps 1 and 2. This step also involves the creation of a "new transformed" table for each "old" (Brumen et al, 2002) .
STEP 4:
The final step in the approach developed by Brumen et al (2002) involves populating the "new" tables (Tables 5.3 and 5.4 ). This population involves the mapping/transformation of the data from the old tables to the new tables. The data that is transferred into the "new" tables is encrypted. The encryption procedd is described in detail be Brumen et al (2002) . The "NameTables" and "AttributeTables" tables, as were described in steps 1 and 3, define the mapping functions. CREATE (TableNames, {"TableNumber", "OldName", "NewName"}) equ(8) CREATE (AttributeNames, {"TableNumber", "Attribute Number", "OldName", "NewName "}) equ (9 (Brumen et al, 2002) . 10  10  Ng6GfE  39982424  17  10  Lm6FkM  40002020  24  10  Sb0JtE  40021818  31  17  Sc2HnK  40021616  38  24  Lm6FkM  40021414   Table 5 .4:-Encrypted Illnesses Table (Brumen et al, 2002) .
A Strategy for Protecting Personal data.
This section presents a strategy that was developed by the author. The strategy involves the modification and combination of a SSM known as the Orion Strategy Approach and a risk analysis model (James, 1996) . The strategy removes much of the vagueness that is inherent in the requirement for "adequate" security. Helen James, (1996) argues that "the highly structured and technical approaches to the management of IS security do not appear to be successful". Even under such management, computer security problems continue to increase at an alarming rate. In an effort to curtail this rate of increase, James suggests adopting a participative approach to security planning and management. In her paper "Managing Information Systems Security: a Soft Approach", James presents one such approach, known as the Orion Strategy Approach. This soft systems approach is justified by Angell's (1993) belief that "information systems are complex sociotechnical systems, which impact on the well being, on the integrity of the whole organisation". The Orion Strategy integrates the risks and technical aspects of security planning with the political, social and organisational culture aspects. It is a "people friendly" strategy. It is a unique approach in the way that it assigns system security problems to the users and individuals that are responsible for the system. This approach is ideally suited for organisations that are storing and processing personal data. Because confidential data may be disclosed to a variety of staffing levels, it is vital that all staff are involved in security planning and management. Individuals that are unaware of the problems that exist cannot be expected to implement measures to solve them. An important finding, following an investigation of this approach, was that by increasing user participation in the planning and management of security, there was an increased awareness of security issues amongst users (James, 1996) . This awareness and involvement in the decision making process regarding security issues resulted in system users adopting a sense of responsibility for the successful operations of security measures. The majority of security strategies that are currently being implemented generally overlook this human component. It is for this reason that the author chose soft systems methodology as a framework onto which a data protection strategy was to be built. The foundation of the Orion Strategy is based on Checkland's (1981) Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), adopting two planes of conceptualisation. The first plane represents the physical world and aspects are proven scientifically. Processes can be seen and measured. Participants' technical knowledge is utilised in this plane. The second plane is the conceptual or abstract plane. Processes and scenarios are abstract or imagined. This plane encourages participant creativity. SSM develops models of systems by extracting information from complex and real-world processes and practices (Ng-Kruelle et al, 2003) . The Orion Strategy is a cycle, comprising of seven activities. Five of these activities take place in the real world, whilst the remaining two are represented in the conceptual world.
The Orion Strategy
Activity 1: Acknowledgement of Possible Security Vulnerability
This phase involves the recognition of security vulnerabilities. The identification of such vulnerabilities can be achieved in a variety of ways including; press reports, educational courses or media coverage. An organisation may also draw from its own experience of security breaches, whether it is unintentional staff disclosure of personal data or the unreliability of security systems.
One of the key requirements of this approach is that senior management must be made aware of security vulnerabilities and must be involved in the formation and overseeing of solutions to counteract these vulnerabilities. The output of this first activity is a management directive aimed at improving security. An independent security specialist, as opposed to an internal member of staff, carries out this investigation. It is hoped that the independent specialist will perform a less biased and more comprehensive investigation than a member of staff. A member of staff may overlook potentially important issues due to that staff member being over familiar with the systems and the organisation's environment. It is at this stage that staff throughout t he organisation's environment are exposed, by means of seminars, to the managerial directive that arose from the previous activity. Seminars, relating to security vulnerabilities and their possible solutions, are arranged by managerial staff and attended by all levels of staffing.
Activity 3: Analyse Systems of Information and Security
The first and second activities are part of the "real world". Activities three and four form the "conceptual world" part of the cycle. In the third activity, a desired set of solutions, information and systems are drafted. These requirements are those which would be considered in a world devoid of physical limitations. This activity calls for a complete description of the resources that are required to achieve the ideal state, and of the integration of these solutions into the security strategy as a whole.
Activity 4: Model Ideal IS Security Situation
This activity identifies risks associated with storing, processing and deleting data. It then calls for proposals of ways in which these risks can be eliminated in a world devoid of boundaries. Parker (1981) believes that the rules of system security are made by the enemy and not the security specialist. Therefore, it is essential that strategists must think like the enemy when developing a security strategy.
Activity 5: Compare Ideal Security with Current Security
Activity five leads the cycle out of the conceptual world and back into the "real world". The "ideal" models that evolved from the fourth activity are compared to models that currently exist in the "real world". These "real world" models are the models that the organisation will adopt. By comparing these models it is possible to identify any ideal solutions that may have been omitted. In the event of such an occurrence, activities three and four are revisited. The author notes that the ideal models may address issues that are not addressed by real models. These issues will not be addressed by revisiting activities three and four.
Activity 6: Identify & Analyse Measures to Fill Gaps
The inputs for this activity are the solution requirements that were identified in the previous activity.
The objective of this activity is to research a vast assortment of solutions that may be possible contenders for fulfilling activity 5's requirements. These solutions are ideally gathered from a wide environment, and their sources depend upon the type of solution requested. Researchers often have novel solutions and can offer valuable advice on programming techniques. For the transferral and analysis of confidential data, these techniques include cell suppression and Brumen's encryption technique, as were described in Section 5. Likewise, if the solution requires hardware products then various vendors and the products that they supply should be investigated. The most appropriate solutions are chosen. In relation to an organisation processing personal data, factors influencing this decision include:
• The confidentiality of the data, • The cost effectiveness of the solution (i.e. do the benefits of ensuring that the data is protected outweigh the financial costs and the costs of tying up resources.
• What countries will the organisation be dealing with either directly or by means of a third party? Activity 7: Establish and Implement Security Plan Management examines the output of the previous activity, i.e. the solutions. If these solutions are approved, then resources including staff, time and financial aid are allocated appropriately to the tasks that must be implemented in order to facilitate these solutions. Upon completion of this activity, the effects that the new solutions have on the organisation and any countermeasures that need to be taken are examined. This examination is carried out at in the first activity of the cycle, thus beginning the cycle again.
The idea of a cycle is essential within an organisation that is processing personal data. Because data laws are constantly being modified, the security strategy of the organisation must also be doing so. The strategy must be dynamic. It is reasonable to assume that an organisation may be processing several activities simultaneously.
In order to apply the Orion Strategy for use within an organisation that gathers and/or processes personal data or to an organisation that is outsourcing work, and by doing so transferring confidential information to a third party, two more activities were added to the strategy. The first of these, Activity 2.5, exists in the Real World plane and bridges activities 2 and 3. In this activity the type of data being gathered or processed by an organisation is analysed. Analysing the data involves categorising data into different confidentiality levels. The more confidential the data, the more security is required to ensure against the accidental or unauthorised disclosure of the data. This activity also involves an investigation of any organisations that may directly or indirectly receive data from the organisation.
The second activity that is added to the Orion Strategy is Activity 0. This activity is not a part of the Orion Strategy. It exists both in the Real and Conceptual World. It is proposed that an organisation establish a team, the role of which is to ensure that data privacy is continuously ensured. Privacy legislation is constantly changing, and this change is occurring more frequently as governments act against acts of terrorism. This continuous change could potentially render an organisation's privacy framework inadequate. It is vital that any changes that may affect an organisation are identified as soon as possible. Since privacy legislation can change at any time, it should be monitored throughout the Orion Strategy cycle and after its completion. Significant changes may result in the reinitialisation of the cycle. To ensure against the disclosure of confidential information, an organisation should identify all privacy laws and guidelines that exist in each organisation that may be a recipient of data. Ideally, when transferring data to another organisation, contracts ensuring the privacy of the transferred data should be signed. These contracts ensure that data privacy is always ensured, even if the receiving body operates in a country that enforces privacy laws that are deemed to be less adequate than those enforced in the transferring organisation.
Activity 6, as discussed earlier, involves the identification of security solutions. The tasks in Activity 6 are expanded to accommodate for the identification of any legal privacy requirements that may not have been catered for in the previous 3 activities. This involves an investigation of the proposed solutions to ensure that data is adequately protected and that they adhere to legal criteria.
As it may not be possible to accommodate all security requirements or solutions, an organisation must employ risk analysis tactics as an aid to deciding upon "adequate" security measures. The author suggests that this risk analysis be conducted in Activity 4. The author identifies this activity as being the most important activity within the cycle. If risks are not adequately assessed, then confidential data runs the risk of being inadequately protected and being accidentally disclosed. The model for Risk Analysis suggested, is one that was developed by Moses, (1995) . The modified Orion Strategy, combined with the Risk Analysis Model is illustrated in Figure  6 .5. Moses, (1995) , believes that the key to determining the security protection required within an organisation involves the use of structured security risk management and analysis.
Risk Analysis
In his paper "Corporate Risk Analysis and Management Strategies", Moses presents two diagrams ( Figure 6 .3 and Figure  6 .4) that illustrate the components involved in the risk and analysis process. These diagrams, produced between 1992 and 1993, are the products of a risk and analysis management project that the CEC sponsored Moses to partake in. The results of the project have been adopted as part of draft ISO standards. (Moses, 1995) As illustrated in Figure 6 .3, the "Security Planning and Management" cycle comprises of five processes. The "Risk Analysis and Management" process is the third process in the cycle. Two external processes drive it: the "Security Strategic Planning and Security Policy" process and the "Risk Analysis Initiation". The "Security Strategic Planning and Security Policy" process involves the creation of corporate policies and strategic security plans. The "Risk Analysis Initiation" process involves the implementation, monitoring and compliance testing of countermeasures.
These countermeasures, also referred to as safeguards, are justified by risk analysis. There are three events that can happen after the execution of the "Risk Analysis and Management" process. Firstly, the process may require further analysis or management, in which case its execution is repeated. In this case, the process is driven by internal factors. Alternatively, countermeasures that have been justified may be implemented or the cycle may begin again with the modification or recreation of corporate policies and strategic plans.
For the purposes of this paper, the main interest is in the examination of the "Risk Analysis and Management" process. The modified Orion Strategy is favoured over the Security Planning and Management" cycle because it is less formal that the Security cycle.
The Orion strategy involves the participation of staff and by doing so cultivates a sense of responsibility amongst staff. Although the Security cycle is well structured and thorough, it does not require the backing of management or the opinions of those who will actually have to implement it. Like the privacy guidelines drawn up by the European Commission, there is the risk that the cycle may be adopted but would fail to be implemented.
A more detailed diagram of the "Risk Analysis and Management" process is illustrated in Figure 6 .4. The process is divided into eight different sub-processes and each sub-process is assigned a label ranging from 3.1 to 3.9. The numbers identify the order in which each sub process is executed, starting at 3.1 and concluding at 3.9. Initially the scope of what needs to be reviewed is established (process 3.1). Upon establishing this scope, the assets such as the data and software that fall within the boundaries of this scope are identified and categorised. Values of importance are assigned to these assets in Process 3.2.
The assigned values are determined by factors such as the importance, confidentiality and availability of assets. All asset dependencies are also identified at this stage.
This, for example, involves the identification of hardware that is required to run certain software, the cost of this hardware 
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and its reliability. Dependencies upon factors such as the effect of warfare on the delivery of assets, and the risk of deliberate hacker attacks on systems must also be considered. Essentially, Process 3.2 ensures that an organisation is fully aware of any risks that are involved as a result of the assets that the company possesses.
In Process 3.3 any threats that have been identified in the previous process are assessed. Processes 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 identify and examine any countermeasures and any constraints that may already be in place within the organisation and also any security objectives. Such an extensive assessment of assets results in the determination of new and justified measures of risks and the identification and selection of appropriate countermeasures.
Moses, (1995) identifies a number of failings within the "Security Planning and
Management" cycle. It does not advise on the level of detail that each process requires. It also fails to advise on whether all processes must be processed, if certain ones may be excluded and if so, which processes these are and the conditions under which this exclusion can occur. This omission is an important observation, since it is neither cost effective nor time effective to exam all systems to the extent that appears to be required by the "Security Planning and Management" cycle. Certain processes may have greater priority over others, yet this has not been presented in the diagram. By prioritising the processes within the cycle an organisation is given the opportunity to reduce cost and time by distributing its resources in accordance to a process's priority. This management of resources may allow a larger number of systems to be examined within a shorter time span.
3.1
Establish 
3.9
Identification and Selection of Counter measures 
Conclusion
An investigation of a number of international policies has led the author to the conclusion that the introduction of an international data privacy act is not a possibility in the foreseeable future. As discussed in Section 4, there are too many prohibiting factors including cultural beliefs and lack of financial backing to allow this to h appen. Further research may involve a comprehensive identification of such prohibiting factors and an in-depth analysis of the information presented in Table 4 .1. A large proportion of Africa, Southern Asia and America are devoid of comprehensive data protection laws. Any location that has no data legislation, or with legislation pending are potential threats to the disclosure of data. With the advances in modern technology, data can easily find its way to these data havens. It is the author's opinion that the guidelines suggested by the European Directive are currently the most comprehensive guidelines in the world. Any country that has adopted the guidelines of the European Directive and is transferring data to a country that does not adhere to these guidelines is subjecting data to a lower level of privacy protection. However, the speed with which telecommunications and other technologies are advancing has meant that even these European Directive guidelines are dated and insufficient.
An even mo re noticeable factor that is rapidly challenging data privacy is terrorism. As discussed in Section 4, the terrorist actions of September the 11 th have increased security but severely weakened data privacy legislation. Governments have enhanced their surveillance powers, but have done so at the risk of affecting privacy, (Innovations Report, 2004) . As terrorism acts increase, privacy may prove to be a right that is sheltering terrorists, a right that may have to be severely restricted at the expense of innocent parties.
After investigating the privacy legislation of a number of countries, it has been noted that most countries require that "adequate" security measures be taken to ensure data privacy. However, as different countries are influenced by different factors, including cultures and governments, the definition of "privacy" can take on several meanings. Privacy measures that are deemed to be adequate in one country may not prove to be so in another. The author believes that this reference to "adequate security measures" fails to ensure that a sufficient security standard is adopted by organisations. The requirement is ambiguous, and the level of security employed by organisations is left to their own discretion. Without the appropriate consultation, organisations may unintentionally overlook important security issues.
The author strongly advises that an organisation that is responsible for the collecting, transferring or processing of data should take its own measures to ensure that data privacy is adequately protected. International legislation has proven inadequate or to contain too many loopholes with regard to data privacy legislation, and it is therefore irresponsible for an organisation not to have a privacy strategy that takes these factors into consideration.
The SSM framework, which was discussed in previous sections, attempts to assist organisations in determining suitable security measures. The framework can be seen as an attempt to remove some of the vagueness that is inherent in the requirement for "adequate" security. SSM involves staff participation at all levels. This framework is ideally suited to developing privacy strategies because its promotion of staff involvement has been shown to develop a sense of self-responsibility and an awareness of privacy issues.
REFERENCES
ADOPTION OF WIRELESS APPLICATIONS, 
